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COMMANDERY OF TBE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WAR PAPER 67. 



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dOMMANDERY OF THE Dl^TI^IdT OF CDLUIVIBIA. 



WAR PAPERS. 

57 

^Ke East Teaaessea d-ampaign., September, -1S63. 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Lieutenant-Colonel %o 

GILBERT Ci KNIFFIN, 

U. S. Volunteers, 

ANO 
READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF JANUARY 4, 1905. 



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On September 19th and 20th. 1863, the battle of Chicka- 
mauga was fought. 

It was in many respects the wildest, fiercest conflict of 
the war. 

It was to the "\^"est what Gettysburg was to the East. It 
extinguished the last hope of the Confederates of overthrowing 
and destroying the Union Army which was being driven into 
the heart of the Confederacy, even as Gettysburg dispelled 
the rebel dream of Northern conquest and plunder, when 
with a mighty effort the Army of the Potomac hurled back 
to the line of the Rappahannock the Army of Northern 
Virginia. 

Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, was, 
in strategic importance, of more value to the Confederates 
than any other point that had surrendered to our victorious 
arms, with the possible exception of Vicksburg, for it was 
the key to the interior of the Confederacy, the converging 
point of the two greatest lines of railway that bore the Con- 
federate supply trains to its armies in the East. It was the 
citadel of Georgia, the gateway to the South, thrown open by 
the prowess of the Army of the Cumberland, and held open 
by the courage and brawn of its stalwart soldiers until the 
leisurely march of reinforcements enabled them to beat back 
the envious spectators of their occupancy of the stronghold, 
from the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. 



4 

But it is not witli tlic battle of Chickamauga that this 
paper has to deal 

General Rosecrans, moving forward from Middle Tennessee, 
whence he had expelled the Confederates in July, under 
imperative orders from the War Department, to the capture 
of Chattanooga, found at the outset of the campaign that it 
could only succeed by threatening the enemy's communications 
southward. To accomplish this purpose so thoroughly as to 
compel the evacuation of Chattanooga it would be necessary 
for him to cross the Tennessee river below the city with his 
entire army and supply trains and construct roads over two 
mountain ranges, thus virtually cutting loose from his base 
of supplies at Nashville and Murfreesboro. In this condition 
it is not, of course, surprising that he felt apprehensive as 
to the support afforded to his flanks, as well as to his rear in 
case the enemy, declining battle, should move via Gunters 
Landing or Whitesburg, on Nashville. He therefore called 
upon the War Department to direct General Burnside to close 
down upon his left and General Grant to protect his right 
and rear. As time passed and information reached him that 
Bragg's Army was being heavily reinforced, General Halleck 
appears to have used every effort to secure co-operation from 
the Armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee, with what success 
it is the object of this paper to show. 

The battle was fought south of Chattanooga. If, in spite 
of the valor of the Union Army, it had been defeated by 
the overwlulniing odds that were arrayed against it, its regi- 
ments disorganized and captured, or driven into the mountains, 
Chattanooga retaken and the Army of the Cumberland elimi- 
nated from the arena of war, the fault would not have justlv 
lain at the door of its heroic commander, but the candid 
historian, studying, with no political bias, the. records of 



that campaign, would have attributed the disaster to the 
absence of a common commander of all the forces in the field 
in Tennessee and northern Mississippi from the field of conflict. 
There is no doubt that had General Halleck's headquarters 
been at Chattanooga instead of at Washington, Hurlbutt's 
Corps from the Army of the Tennessee and Hartsuff's Corps 
from the Armv of the Ohio would have been on the field of 
Chickamauga. 

General Boynton, in his masterly description of the Chatta- 
nooga campaign and its attendant battles, says: "There had 
been time enough after General Rosecrans' explanation of his 
proposed plan of campaign to force General Burnside with 
twenty thousand men down from East Tennessee and to 
have brought all needed strength for the other flank from the 
Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi." I leave to the 
survivors of the latter army, who have usually been found 
equal to anv emergency, to explain whv, in disobedience of 
orders from General Halleck, one hundred thousand men were 
permitted to lie idle on the banks of the Mississippi while 
the Army of the Cumberland was engaged in a death grapple 
on Chickamauga Creek^with not only its old antagonist, but 
with Confederate troops withdrawn from the front of Meade 
in Virginia and others paroled by Grant at Vicksburg, and 
when the appearance of even one army corps at Rome, Georgia, 
would have held back reinforcements to Bragg's army from 
the south and east via Atlanta. The failure of General Burn- 
side to reinforce General Rosecrans is a theme that may 
interest the student of the joint campaign which resulted in 
the permanent occupation of Cumberland Gap, Knox'ville 
and Chattanooga. 

The East Tennessee campaign of August and September, 
1863, under the light of the record, embraces not only the 



movements of General Rosecrans, but to an equal extent those 
of General Burnside. The Army of the Ohio on duty in Ken- 
tucky consisted of the Ninth Corps, commanded byMaj-Gen. 
J. G. Parke, and the Twenty-third Corps, under command of 
Maj.-Gen. George L. HartsulT. Tlie first of these corps 
numbered on August ^oth, •present for duty, equipped": 
Infantry, 5.965; artillery, 208; total. 6.173. The Twenty- 
third Corps, composed of three divisions, numbered : Infantry. 
14.279; cavalry. 6.073; artillery. 1,462; total. 21,814. The 
first division of this corps, under eonnnand of General Boyle. 
6,357 men of all arms, was required for duty in guarding 
various military posts in Kentucky, leaving the remainder. 
15.457. for offensive operations. The total effective strength 
of both corps was 21,630. The advance into East Tennessee 
commenced August 20th. General Hascall's division moved 
from Crab Orchard, crossing the Cumberland at Smith's 
Ford; General White's division crossed at Jamestown, the 
cavalrv and mounted infantry, Generals Carter and vShackel- 
ford and Colonels Foster and Woolford, moving in advance 
of each column. The two columns were ordered to concentrate 
after crossing the Cumberland Mountains near Huntsville, and 
move upon Montgomery in East Tennessee. From there the 
movements, as Burnside telegraphed Halleck, would be 
"according to circumstances, but probably upon Kingston 
and Loudon, as these seem to be the places to which General 
Rosecrans desires us to go in order to co-operate fully with 
him. At all events, our final destination will be Knoxville. 
We have had very serious difticulty to contend with in bad 
roads and short forage; in fact, the country is about destitute. 
We shall have still greater difficulties in that way to overcome, 
but if Rosecrans occupies the enemy fully and no troops are 
allowed to come down the road from Richmond, from the 



eastern army, I think we will be successful." The army 
arrived at Montgomery on the ist of September, having en- 
countered no opposition. There was nothing there to oppose 
it. General Carter's cavalry division moved thence in three 
columns, one under General Shackelford on Loudon bridge, 
one under Colonel Byrd on Kingston, and one under Colonel 
Foster on Knoxville. 

Major-General Simon Bolivar Buckner, in command of the 
department of East Tennessee, had, in obedience to orders 
from the Confederate war department, gathered up all his 
available force, with the exception of 2,000 men under command 
of Brig. -Gen. John B. Frazer, who was left in defense of Cum- 
berland Gap, and a few isolated detachments at Knoxville 
and other places under command of Brigadier-General Jackson, 
and formed a junction with Bragg's army at Chattanooga. 
Previous to leaving Knoxville General Buckner wrote Maj.- 
Gen. Sam Jones, in command of the department of Western 
Virginia, requesting him to look after his department during 
his absence. Jones's headquarters were at Dublin, Virginia. 
He had his hands full taking care of Generals Averill and 
Scammon, who had on several occasions pushed their com- 
mands, across the mountains from the north and Kanawha 
Valley, and he was unable with troops at his command to do 
much besides look after his own department. In compliance 
with Buckner's request, however, he came down the road as 
far as Abington, when on the 6th of September he wrote 
General Frazer, directing him to hold Cumberland Gap as 
long as possible, as reinforcements were then on the way from 
the east. The long line, extending from Staunton, Virginia, 
to the Salt Works, over 200 miles, comprised in the depart- 
ment of West Virginia, rendered it out of the power of General 
Jones to reinforce him with his own troops. In compliance 
with the request of General Jones, General Lee returned to 



^ 



him one of his own brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General 
Wharton, which had been for several months on duty in the 
Army of Northern Virginia, and later another under command 
of Brigadier-General Corse. General Jones's messenger reached 
General Frazer too late to prevent his surrender, and 2,000 
men were thus subtracted from the little force left to oppose 
the occupation of East Tennessee by the troops under General 
Burnside. 

The following extract from the returns of the Army of 
Western \'irginia and East Tennessee will show the troops 
actually on duty in East Tennessee from the i6th of September, 
at which date the brigade last mentioned arrived. 

Organization of the Command of Maj.-Gen. Sam Jones 

IN East Tennessee and Western Virginia in 

September, 1863. 

Injantiy Brigades. 

Brigadier-General Corse (sent by General Lee) — 15th, 29th, 
and 30th A'irginia. 

Brigadier-General Jackson (Buckner's Corps) — Thomas's Le- 
gion, Walker's battalion. 

Brigadier-General Wharton (at Salt \\'^orks) — 51st Virginia; 
30th Virginia battalion; 45th Virginia. 

Cavalry Brigades. 
Brigadier-General W. E Jones (made up from fragmentary 

commands) — 21st Virginia cavalry; 27th, 34th, 36th, and 

37th Virginia cavalry battalions. 
Brigadier-General John S Williams (one-half of them mounted) 

— 64th Virginia detached cavalry; ist Tennessee cavalry; 

4th Kentucky cavalry; May's Kentucky cavalry battalion; 

loth Kentucky cavalry battalion; i6th Georgia cavalry 

battalion. 



Artillery. 

J. Floyd King — Otey's Battery; Lowry's Battery; Ring- 
gold's Battery; Davidson's Battery. 
The effective total of the above command was, up to the 

1 6th of September, about 4,000. Corse's brigade increased 

it to 5,180, and Wharton's brigade, 1,852 strong, was stationed 

at the Salt Works. 

The force with which General Burnside confronted that of 

General Jones, above mentioned, was as follows: 

Organization of the Army of the Ohio in East Tennessee, 
September 10, 1863, under Major-Generai, Burnside. 

Twenty-third Anny Corps, Major-General Hartsufj. 

Second Division, General White — Infantry: ist Brigade, 
Col. O. H. Moore, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, Col. M. W. 
Chapin, 4 regiments. Artillery: two batteries. 

Third Division, General Hascall — Infantry: ist Brigade, 
Col. S- A. Gilbert, 4 regiments; 2d Brigade, Col. D. Cameron, 
4 regiments. Artillery: two batteries. 

Fourth Division, Gen. vS. P. Carter — Cavalry and mounted 
infantry: ist Brigade, Col. R. K. Byrd, 4 regiments; 2d 
Brigade, General vShackelford, 5 regiments; 3d Brigade, Col. 
J. P. Carter, 4 regiments; Independent Brigade, Col. Frank 
Woolford, 3 regiments. Artillery: five batteries. 
Present for duty (equipped) : 

Twenty-third Anny Corps. 

Infantry 6,559 

Mounted Infantry 3.123 

Cavalry 3.436 

Artillery i,34i 

14,459 



lO 



Ninth Army Corps. 

Infantry (>>^22 

ArtillcM-y m 

Total U. S. troops in P^ast Tennessee 21,792 

The cavalry expeditions from Montgomery were all success- 
ful. Kingston and Knoxville were taken without opposition, 
but at Loudon Bridge Buckner's rear-guard was strongly 
posted. After a brisk skirmish they were driven back by 
Shackelford's command. The railroad bridge over the Holston, 
a fine structure, had been saturated with turpentine, and the 
guard no sooner retreated across it than it was committed to 
the flames. Colonel Byrd captured at Kingston a steamboat 
in process of construction, and communicated with Colonel 
Minty's pickets, who formed the extreme left fiank of General 
Rosecrans's army. 

Leaving Byrd's brigade, 3,000 strong, at Loudon and Athens, 
General Burnside pushed the remainder of the Twenty-third 
Corps on to Knoxville. Buckner had left Knoxville the day 
before Colonel Foster's arrival, leaving behind him a small 
force to guard a considerable quantity of quartermaster's 
stores, the Government work-shops, and a large quantity of 
salt, which fell into Foster's hands. General Burnside reached 
the city on the 3d. The East Tennessee troops, separated 
for manv weary months from their families, were greeted with 
expressions of the tenderest affection by the people all along 
the line of march. National flags were brought out from 
their hiding places and flung to the breeze from nearly every 
house. There was little use for army rations — a, feast awaited 
the troops at every village. Women stood by the roadside 
with buckets of water, fruit, and cakes, which they gave 



II 



freely, refusing all offers of pay. As they drew near Knoxville 
the city was radiant with flags. vSixty young ladies took their 
places by the roadside, waving flags, and shouting "Hurrah 
for the Union." Ladies came out of their houses to greet 
Generals Burnside and Carter. Seizing their hands, they 
wept for joy, crying, "Welcome to East Tennessee." Hun- 
dreds of people of both sexes and all ages collected in a few 
minutes, and both General Burnside and General Carter 
addressed them, promising that they should not again be 
deserted to their enemies. The demonstrations were not 
boisterous, but the intense joy imparted by these tidings was 
exhibited in quiet rejoicing. Men who for months had been 
hidden in caves in the hills and in mountain fastnesses came 
in and were overjoyed at their deliverance. The halt at 
Knoxville was very brief. On the 5th General vShackelford 
with his brigade, 1,434 strong, was sent in the direction o 
Cumberland Gap to cut off escape by the force in occupation 
of that stronghold, and on the 7th General Burnside left Knox- 
ville with two regiments of cavalry, two of mounted infantry, 
and Konkle's battery, and joined Shackelford on the 9th. 
Colonel de Courcey, who had advanced with his brigade of 
the Ninth Corps, two infantry regiments, two of cavalry and 
a battery of artillery via Loudon, Kentucky, 1,834 strong, 
had by this time taken position on the north, and summoned 
the garrison to surrender, which demand was refused. The 
garrison was composed of four regiments of infantry from 
North Carolina, one from Virginia, and one from Georgia, on€ 
regiment of East Tennessee cavalry, two field batteries, and 
three guns in position. General Buckner stopped long enough 
on his way to Chattanooga to telegraph General Frazer from 
Loudon on the 30th of August to evacuate the Gap with all 
speed, to burn and destroy everything that could not be trans- 



12 



ported, and to report to Ocneral vSam Jones at Abingdon, 
Virginia, 125 miles distant. As General Frazer had been led 
to believe that East Tennessee was to be held by the Confede- 
rates, and knowing the importance of the Gap in this event, he 
at once construed the telegram of the yAh to be a trick of 
the Yankees and replied to it in cipher, stating his condition 
for defense. He had over 2,000 men and forty days' rations, 
and believed he could hold the position, but asked to be 
informed if he should still evacuate. The response to this 
dispatch came on the following day ordering him to hold his 
position. This order was countermanded by General Bragg 
at Chattanooga, but as telegraphic communication with Frazer 
had been cut off in the meantime no order to evacuate the 
Gap reached him before the investment of the place on the 
6th of September. The defenses, about two miles in extent, 
required a reliable force of about 6.000 men and appropriate 
artillerv to properly man. Batteries of light guns were placed 
in position to command the three roads converging at the 
Gap, but owing to the tortuous course of the roads they had 
range of not over four hundred yards, except on the south, 
where thev had full sweep to the extent of their range. The 
guns were 6-pounder smooth-bores and 12-pounder howitzers. 
The First Tennessee Confederate cavalry, under command of 
Colonel J. B. Carter, an active and efficient regiment about 
600 strong, was sent out to reconnoitre in the direction of 
Knoxville. where it encountered General Shackelford's advance 
and was driven into Powell's Valley, when by Frazer's order 
it continued up the valley on the Virginia road and reported 
to General Williams. The .Sixty-second and Sixty-fourth 
North Carolina were conscripts, and were thoroughly imbued 
with Union sentiments. The colonel of the Sixty-second was 
absent. He soon after resigned and became an open advocate 



13 

of the Union. His men were accustomed to declare that they 
had never fired agun at a Union man and they never would. 
Three hundred of the vSixty-fourth North Carolina had already 
deserted in a body, and the regiment was small, but under 
better discipline than the Sixty-second. The Fifty-fifth 
Georgia had about 500 men for duty. It had been on provost- 
marshal duty at Knoxville, and was regarded as tolerably 
good, although their men rode their colonel on a rail and only 
allowed him to resume command on promise of better behavior. 
He and the lieutenant-colonel were both absent and Major 
Printup was in command. Colonel Slemp's Virginia regiment 
and Burnes's battalion joined Frazer from Marshall's command 
on the last of August. For insubordination and inefficiency 
this regiment had no equal in either army. To add, if possible, 
to the difficulties with which General Frazer had to contend, 
his predecessor in command had allowed the roof of the powder 
magazine to go to decay, and on examination most of it was 
found to be saturated with rain water. A requisition had 
been made for an additional supplv, which the ordnance 
office at Knoxville had duly pigeon-holed and failed to fill. 
The only drinking water upon which the garrison had to rely 
was obtained at a spring in the valley on the south side of 
the Gap near a mill, which latter, when run to its full capacity, 
ground wheat about as fast as the men could eat the flour. 
News of the capture of Loudon and the burning of the rail- 
road bridge was followed by the intelligence of the capture 
of Knoxville, and rightly surmising that the next move would 
be upon Cumberland Gap, the commander at once made 
arrangements for defense. A device for conveying water to 
the top of the hill by means of telegraph wires was designed, 
but failed in construction for lack of material. Oxen were 
put to hauling it up in barrels, but broke down on the second 



14 

trip. It was then detfrmined thai the spring and milk must 
be guarded, and 150 men of the Sixty-second North CaroHna 
were detailed for this duty, but were put to flight by 100 of 
Shackelford's cavalry, who dashed down upon the mill and 
burned it on the night of their arrival. The condition of the 
beleagured garrison was now critical in the extreme, and it 
was onlv necessary for the two brigades, one on the north and 
the other on the south, to put on a bold front, concealing 
their real strength, to insure the surrender of the stronghold. 
On the 6th Colonel Carter had reported that the force advanc- 
ing from Knoxville had steadily driven him in, and that he had 
reason to believe it to be very strong. 

On the 7th General Shackelford sent the following communi- 
cation to General Frazer: 

"Headquarters U. S. Forces in Front of Cumberland 

Gap. 

" September 7, 1863. 
''To General Frazer, Commanding Conjederate forces, Cumber- 
land dap: 
"You are surrounded by my forces. In order to save the 
effusion of blood and the unnecessary loss of life, I demand 
the unconditional surrender of yourself and command by 
3 o'clock, inst. 

" I am, General, ver}' respectfully, 

"J. M. Shackelford, 
Briqadier-deneral Com ma nding.' ' 

To which General Frazer made answer, as follows: 

" Headquarters, Cumberland Gap, 

''September y, 1863. 
"To Brigadier-ijeneral Shackelford, Commanding U. S. Forces: 
"I have just received your note of to-day demanding the 



15 

unconditional surrender of myself and forces. In reply, I 
have simply to state that I must decline acceding thereto. 
" I am, General, very respectfully, 

" J. W. Frazer, 

" Brigadier -General." 

Similar proposals were made on the following day, both bv 
Shackelford on the south, and deCourceyon the north, which 
were met by a polite refusal to comply. General Burnside 
arrived at General Shackelford's headquarters on the night 
of the 8th, and on the morning of the 9th sent the following 
note to General Frazer: 

"Headquarters Army of the Ohio, 

" September g, 1863. 
"Brigadier-General Frazer, Commanding Confederate Forces, 
Cumberland Gap. 
"General: As ample time has been given for negotiation, 
you will be kind enough to dismiss at once from your lines 
our flags of truce, from both sides of the Gap, and cease com- 
munication with any of the United States forces, excepting 
through myself, as none other will be considered valid. At 
the same time, with the view of avoiding the effusion of blood, 
I beg to state that I have a force present with me sufficient 
in all human probability, to carry your position, and should 
your reply not be satisfactory, shall commence operations, 
with the view of assaulting your position at such points and 
with such forces as I may deem proper, immediately on the 
return of the officer carrying this note, who has permission 
to remain one hour at your pickets. 

" I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"A. E. Burnside, 

" Major-General." 



i6 



" Major Van Buren, Aide-de-Camp on my staff, will be the 
bearer hereof." 

On receipt of this peremptory demand from the majoi 
general commanding the department, whose presence at that 
remote point indicated that he had nothing to fear fn^m the 
Confederate forces in Kast Tennessee, General Frazer wisely 
conclnded that all hope of succor was cut off. To General 
Burnside's demand for immediate surrender he returned the 
following note : 

" Headquarters Cumuerlaxd Gap, 

" September 9, 1863. 
"To General A. E Burnsidc, Commandinq U. S. Forces. 

"General: As my communications with General Shackel- 
ford and Colonel de Courcey will show, I intended holding 
the position, but will surrender on condition that the officers 
and men of my command be released on parole. 
" I am. General, yery respectfully, 

"J. W. Frazer, 

' ' Brigadier-iicncral. 

This proposal was refused by General Burnside, and the 
result was the unconditional surrender of the Gap with all 
its garrison and munitions. 

Thus was Cumberland Gap, one of the strongest positions 
on the continent, the natural gateway to the Confederacy, 
capable of being made impregnable against any force that 
could be sent against it, twice abandoned and once surrendered 
without firing a gun in its defense. 

^Major-General Sam Jones was directed by the Confederate 
war department to extend a protectorate over the district of 
East Tennessee. Arriving upon the scene of operations too 
late to prevent the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland Gap, 



17 

he turned his attention to the formation of a command which 
should prevent the advance of Burnside's troops eastward, 
while by a show of force he should be able to hold his antago- 
nist from participation in the struggle then impending near 
Chattanooga. 

The value of the Salt Works at Saltville, fourteen miles 
east of Abingdon, was inestimable to the southern army. 
Their destruction would inflict an irreparable loss upon the 
Confederacy. Although the capture and destruction of these 
works seemed never to have entered into the calculations of 
General Burnside or the War Department, the head of General 
Burnside's column had no sooner turned in that direction 
from Cumberland Gap, than General Jones at once conjectured 
the objective point to be the precious Salt Works, which it 
had been his especial duty to guard. 

On the 14th the Union troops were reported to be moving 
from Cumberland Gap on the vSalt Works. General Wharton 
was placed in command of the defenses and Otey's battery 
ordered to report to him. Majors Chenoweth and Prentice 
were ordered to send scouts out and ascertain the truth of 
the report. Col. J. E. Carter, in command of the First Tennessee 
cavalry brigade, was directed to move via Reedy Creek and 
Moccasin Gap, and "if the enemy moves toward Saltville, get 
in his rear and harass him." 

Inquiries were next ordered to be made to what extent he 
could relv upon the home guards to protect the Salt Works, 
with the intention of removing Wharton to the front. It 
will be observed that the mind of General Jones had become 
impressed with two ideas, both of which were erroneous. 
One, that Burnside had but a portion of his force in East 
Tennessee, having sent the greater portion of his troops to 
co-operate with Rosecrans below Chattanooga ; the other, that 



i8 



General Burnsidc had designs npon the Salt Works. Both 
ideas were precisely those which wonld naturally occur to the 
mind of an intelligent antagonist, conversant with the impor- 
tance of both movements, and that he was wrong in his surmise 
reflects less credit upon his antagonist than upon himself. 
General Lee, whose mind embraced in its comprehensive grasp 
the operations of the Confederate army throughout the whole 
arena of war, had already responded to the call of General 
Bragg for reinforcements by detaching one of his strongest 
corps, under Longstreet, for service at Chattanooga, and 
now finding the Salt Works, upon which his army depended, 
threatened, he had promptly supplied to General Jones an 
additional brigade under command of Brigadier-General Corse. 
Wharton's brigade was encamped at Glade Springs, within 
supporting distance of the artillery in defense of the Salt 
Works. Corse was brought to the front and preparations 
made to defend the line of road leading into the valley of the 
Upper Tennessee, and, if possible, prevent Burnside from 
advancing upon the Salt Works and also from detaching any 
considerable portion of his force to reinforce Rosecrans. In 
response to a telegram from President Davis, asking the strength 
and position of his forces, General Jones replied as follows: 

" JoNESBORO, September 15, 1863. 
'"His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, 
"Richmond, Va. 
"Your telegram of yesterday received last night. I shall 
withdraw the troops from this to the Watauga and Holston 
to await the reinforcements and be in better position to meet 
an advance on vSaltville. No reliable information of the 
movements of the enemy from Cumberland Gap. Picket 
skirmishing in front every day. Our pickets behaving well. 

" Sam Jones, 

" Major-General." 



^9 

General Jones says in his report: "Under all the circum- 
stances of the case I thought the best service I could render 
with the small force under my command would be to check 
and detain the superior force in my front until the battle which 
I supposed was impending near Chattanooga should be de- 
cided." 

On the 9th of September General Burnside reported the 
capture of Cumberland Gap and 2,000 prisoners and the occu- 
pation of East Tennessee from Jonesboro on the northeast 
to Athens in the southwest. To this report Halleck responded 
on the iith congratulating him upon his success, directing 
him to hold the Gaps in the North Carolina mountains and 
to connect with General Rosecrans, at least with his cavalry, 
notifying him that the latter would occupy Dalton or some 
point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta. On 
the 13th Halleck telegraphed Burnside as follows: "It is 
important that all the available force of your command be 
pushed into East Tennessee. All your scattered forces should 
be concentrated there. vSo long as we hold Tennessee Ken- 
tucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly 
as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. 
Bragg may merely hold the passes in the mountains to cover 
Atlanta and move his main army through northern Alabama 
to reach the Tennessee river and turn Rosecrans's right, 
cutting off his supplies. In that case he will turn Chattanooga 
over to you and move to interrupt Bragg." 

Here is a positive order, as explicit as any given to Rose- 
crans, for Burnside to move his infantry down towards Chatta- 
nooga to connect with Rosecrans. The same order had been 
given on the 5th of August, and had formed a part of the plan 
of the expedition. It was reiterated on the 5th of September, 
when he was directed to keep Rosecrans informed of his move- 



« 



ments and arrange with him for co-operation On September 
iith, when he was notified of Rosecrans's position and need 
of reinforcements, and again on the i,Uh. as seen in the above 
dispatch, he had in Tennessee a (Hvision of cavalry and 
mounted infantry whose effective strength, as shown l)y the 
field returns of vSeptember 20th, was: "Present for duty, 
equipped, 6,700, with 34 pieces of artillery." His infantry 
and artillerv, under Hartsuff, numbered: "Present for duty, 
ec|uipped, 6,586, with ,'^2 pieces oi artillery." One has but 
to imagine the grand results of the Chattanooga campaign if 
these orders had been obeved Burnside entered Knoxville 
with an armv of 10,000 men on the 6th of September, leaving 
a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry and mounted 
infantry at Loudon and Athens. He found supplies abundant, 
besides which he had crossed the mountains with 2,000 beef 
cattle. His advance, under Foster, captured at Knoxville, 
five locomotives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity of 
provisions. After capturing the force and subsistence stores 
at Cumberland Gap and opening the route to and from Ken- 
tucky, and arming the loyal East Tennesseeans \vith 5,000 
stand of arms brought with him for that purpose, he had 
ample time and opportunitv in which to ha\e dispatched at 
least 10,000 infantry to co-operate with Rosecians. On the 
1 8th he acknowledged the receipt of Halleck's dispatch of 
the 13th, above quoted, and also of one dated on the 14th, 
which read as follows: "There are reasons whv vou should 
reinforce General Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is 
believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. 
You must be there to help him." To this urgent appeal he 
replied on the i8th from Knoxville: "Orders to go below will 
be obeyed as soon as possible. I go to Greenville to-night — 
(in the opposite direction). Dispositions for attacking the 



21 



enemy at Jonesboro made. I will lose no time in doing as 
you order. No direct telegraphic communication as yet. 
Hope to get it to-morrow." The next day, while Rosecrans, 
after the brilliant flank movement which compelled the evacua- 
tion of Chattanooga, found his army on the eve of a terrible 
battle, Burnside telegraphed from Greenville : ' ' Will obey your 
instructions in reference to Rosecrans. Our troops occupy 
Jonesboro. Enemy retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry in 
pursuit. Am now sending every man that can be spared to 
aid Rosecrans. / shall go on to Jonesboro. As soon as I learn 
the result of our movements to the east, will go down by rail- 
road and direct the movements of reinforcements for Rose- 
crans. I have directed every available man in Kentucky to 
be sent here." On the 20th he received a dispatch from 
Halleck stating that General Meade did not believe that any 
of Ewell's troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared; that 
Longstreet, Johnston, and Bragg had concentrated against 
Rosecrans, who was on the Chickamauga river, twenty miles 
south of Chattanooga, closing thus: "He is expecting a battle 
and wants you to sustain his left. Every possible effort must 
be made to assist him." To this Burnside replied from Knox- 
ville on the 20th: "You may be sure I will do all I can for 
Rosecrans. Arrived here last night, and am hurrying troops 
in his direction. / go up the road to-night for a day." 

The following dispatch received by Rosecrans on the battle 
field on the 19th, and that which follows on the 20th, shows 
that Halleck fully expected a junction of the two armies: 
"I have no direct communication with Burnside or Halleck. 
On the 15th Hurlbut says he is moving towards Decatur. I 
hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from Vicksburg. 
A telegram from Burnside on the 17th, just received, says my 
orders to move down to reinforce you will be obeyed as soon 



22 



as possible. Burnside's cavalry ought to be near you by this 
time." That on the 20th is as follows: "General Burnside's 
instructions before he left Kentucky were to connect with your 
left. These instructions have been repeated five or six times, 
and he has answered that he was moving with that object. 
I think his advance cannot be far from you." On the 21st: 
"Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th. He was then 
sending to vour aid all his available force. It is hoped that 
you will hold out until he reaches you. He was directed to 
connect with you ten days ago. I can get no reply from 
Hurlbut or Sherman." 

So the correspondence went on from day to day, and not a 
man was sent to Rosecrans. The battle of Chickamauga was 
fought on the 19th and 20th. The noble Army of the Cumber- 
land, struggling against terrible odds, held its position even 
after the fatal blunder which opened its lines and admitted 
Longstreet's victorious legions upon its flanks. Obedience to 
the positive orders of General Halleck would have brought 
the infantry of the Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample 
time to retrieve the disaster if not to have prevented it. The 
force that required only a small portion of Burnside's troops 
to drive back from Knoxville to Jonesboro and which virtually 
prevented the co-operation of Burnside with Rosecrans, has 
been already stated. This is how Burnside states it in his 
dispatch to Halleck of the 21st of September: "Before I 
knew of the necessity of sending immediate assistance to General 
Rosecrans I had sent a considerable portion of my force to 
capture and drive out a large force of the enemy under General 
Sam Jones, stationed on the road from Bristol to Jonesboro, 
which amounts to at least six thousand men." 

The student of these campaigns cannot fail to be impressed 
with the folly of the War Department in attempting to direct 



23 

the management of two separate armies operating upon parallel 
lines, eastward from their respective bases, by telegraph from 
a point a thousand miles distant, without giving to one com- 
mander extraordinary powers in case of emergency. The 
misfortunes that attended the Army of the Cumberland could 
have been arrested if Burnside had remained in Cincinnati, 
sending Hartsuff into East Tennessee. Burnside's commission 
antedated that of Rosecrans as Major-General, three days, 
and for this reason the latter could not order the Army of 
the Ohio to his assistance. General Burnside told Hartsuflf 
that he could not go to Chattanooga, as he ranked Rosecrans, 
and confusion might rise; to which Hartsuff responded: "Let 
me go; I don't rank him." 

General Burnside, however, explains his action in the same 
report, as follows: "It should be remembered that up to the 
night of the i6th I was acting under instructions to occupy 
the upper country of East Tennessee, and all of my available 
forces were well up the valley above Knoxville. All that 
could be turned back were started at once, and as soon as 
possible the remainder were withdrawn from the presence of 
the enemy and turned back for the purpose of proceeding to 
the relief of General Rosecrans. The point where the troops 
were turned back on the 17th was 140 miles from Chickamauga, 
where General Rosecrans was fighting on the 19th, and the 
advance of our forces was over 200 miles distant therefrom. 
It will be readily seen that under no circumstances could we 
have reached even the neighborhood of General Rosecrans's 
forces during that battle. The troops were moved in that 
direction as rapidly as possible. Many dispatches passed 
between General Halleck and myself after this, in reference to 
going to Rosecrans's assistance after he had established him- 
self at Chattanooga, and some misunderstanding occurred in 



24 

regard to the purport of these dispatches. I was averse to 
doing what would in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee 
and he was anxious lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold 
Chattanooga. He was not disturbed at Chattanooga, and we 
held our ground in Hast Tennessee, so that what occurred in 
no way affected the result." 

Regarding the two campaigns as one in their objects and 
the two armies as but the right and left wings of a grand army 
of invasion of Confederate territory moving on parallel lines, 
under a common commander, it is reasonable to suppose that 
reinforcements would have been made as occasion demanded. 
The Confederates regarded the destruction of the Army of 
the Cumberland as of paramount importance, and boldly 
massed an army in its front of suflicient magnitude, in their 
opinion, to accomplish that object. The temporary evacua- 
tion of Chattanooga southward was rendered necessary by the 
strategical movement of a large portion of General Rosecrans's 
army upon Bragg's communications, but the feeling in the 
Confederate army was an unwavering faith in their success. 
This feeling was shared by the people at large. Hundreds 
of families who had left their homes in Middle Tennessee and 
Kentucky, and kept in the rear of the Confederate army in 
its retrograde movement, were congregated at Rome, Georgia. 
Thev had led a nomadic life, moving from Murfreesboro to 
Winchester, thence to Chattanooga and Rome, and, inspired 
with the hope of returning to their homes as the result of 
the defeat and pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, 
thev had their goods and baggage packed in wagons ready 
to follow the victorious flag of the Confederacy northward to 
the Cumberland. The fancy of many took a wilder flight. 
Knowing that Rosecrans's army alone stood between the 
powerful host of veteran troops concentrating at Lafayette, 



25 

and the Ohio River, it was not too much to hope that a vigorous 
pursuit of a disorganized army, demoraHzed by defeat, would 
carry the war into the Northern States. 

The arrival of Longstreet's advance gave promise of an 
easy victory. Whatever may have been the overweening 
confidence of General Rosecrans in the strength of his army, 
and however much he may have underestimated that of his 
antagonist, as indicated by the speedy evacuation of Chatta- 
nooga, he no sooner became satisfied of the approach of rein- 
forcements to Bragg from the Army of the Potomac than he saw 
the necessity of a corresponding increase of his own strength. 
A commanding-general, controlling the movements of both 
Rosecrans and Burnside, should, at this supreme moment, 
have had his headquarters at Chattanooga. The simultaneous 
capture of that city and Cumberland Gap took place on the 
9th of September, and within three days thereafter two facts 
were well known to Burnside and Rosecrans. The former 
knew that no considerable force confronted him from the 
eastward, and that none was likely to advance from that 
direction, as Buckner had, in obedience to orders, evacuated 
the valley of the Tennessee — a thing which would not be 
likely to occur if the Confederate war department designed to 
attempt holding that territory. General Rosecrans had ample 
evidence that a large army was being concentrated to give 
him battle. Both these facts would have been at once com- 
municated to the commanding general. 

General White's division of infantry, 3,000 strong, and 
Byrd's division of cavalry and mounted infantry, 2,000 strong, 
remained in the. vicinity of Loudon and Athens, within three 
days' march of Chattanooga, until the 15th of vSeptember, 
four days before the battle of Chickamauga, when White was 
ordered to Knoxville. The Ninth Army Corps was moving 



26 



bv easy marches from Crab Orchard, Kentucky, via Cumber- 
land Gap to Knoxville. There was no reason why all Burn- 
side's infantry could not have been sent to reinforce Rose- 
crans, leaving the cavalry and artillery to defend Knoxville. 
Cumberland Gap was amply defended l)y de Courcey's brigade, 
and the advance of the Ninth Army Corps reached its vicinity 
on the 17th, thus providing against any possibility of its 
recapture. 

That a reinforcement of lo.ooo effectiyes would have been 
ordered by forced marches to Chattanooga from Burnside's 
army by a commanding general, stationed where he should 
have been, as early as the 13th, is as probable as any supposi- 
tion that could be made with regard to the movements of 
troops at any juncture during the war. That the order was 
not given is due solely to the absence of a common commander, 
and his absence was what Napoleon termed "worse than a 
crime — a blunder."* 



* Commonly attributed to Talleyrand. 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




